| The above PDF file contains an incriminating stash of Diebold Election
Systems memos. In the support link, check out
October 2001 for the "alter the audit log in
Access" memo, April 2000 for memos that refer to
transmitting vote data from optical scan machines by cell
phone, April 2002 for a Tab Iredale (senior programmer)
memo that urges folks to avoid getting Windows CE
certified by anyone, and January 2001 for a memo from Ken
Clark (principal engineer) talking about how pointless it
is to attempt a recount on a touch screen.
Then, bear in mind that GEMS programs 1.11.14 and 1.17.17
are certified -- and check out how many times they are
installing 1.14.xx and 1.15.xx series and using them in
elections! (Totally illegal: what this means is the
software used in these elections was never looked at by
ANYONE except a handful of programmers in Canada.) Pretty
much throws the whole certification and testing argument
out the window.
There are a few "gems" (pardon the pun) about
blaming problems on the customer; one where they find
that they upgraded software for the optical scan and now
it won't work on some optical scan machines in Virginia.
They discuss giving them new optical scans, but decide to
instead find a way to blame it on the customer and make
them pay for new machines.
Also look for one in Colorado Springs (El Paso County
Colorado) where they discuss the fact that they can't
pick up a check until they do a demo of what they sold,
but they don't have software that does what they sold, so
they discuss a way to fake the demo, mentioning they've
faked it before...
Boring reading, but productive for anyone who wants to
head directly into your attorney general's office and
demand that we put a stop to using Diebold optical scan
and touch screens.
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