Patrick Knowlton's Legal Complaint


THE FULL TEXT OF THE PATRICK KNOWLTON LAWSUIT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Division

PATRICK JAMES KNOWLTON             )    
2424 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW       )
Washington, DC  20037              )
                                   )
    Plaintiff,                     )
                                   )
        v.                         )    
                                   )
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA       )
Serve: Eric Holder, Esquire        )
United States Attorney             )    
555 Fourth Street, NW              )
Suite 5806                         )
Washington, DC  20001,             )
                                   )
        and                        )
                                   )
Janet Reno, Esquire                )
Attorney General of                )
the United States                  )    Civil Action No. 96-2467 
10th & Pennsylvania                )    (NHJ)                    
Avenue, NW                         )   
Washington, DC  20535,             )    
                                   )
        and                        )
                                   )
LAWRENCE MONROE                    ) 
Individually,                      ) 
and as Agent of the                ) 
Federal Bureau of Investigation    ) 
8128 Blandsford Drive,             )
Manassas, Virginia  22110          )
                                   )
        and                        )
                                   )
RUSSEL T. BRANSFORD                )
Individually,                      )
and as Agent of the                )
Federal Bureau of Investigation    ) 
Address Unknown                    )
                                   )
        and                        )
                                   )
AYMAN ALOURI                       )
1707 Tyvale Court                  )
Vienna, Virginia  22180,           )
                                   )
        and                        )
                                   )
ABDEL SALEM ALOURI                 )
1707 Tyvale Court                  )
Vienna, Virginia  22180,           )
                                   )    
        and                        )
                                   )
JOHN DOE No. 1, through            )    
JOHN DOE No. 24, inclusive,        )
                                   )
      Defendants.                  )
                                   )    

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights

in violation of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2), Obstructing justice;

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Assault; Battery; Civil Conspiracy)

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Patrick James Knowlton, by and through his attorneys, and respectfully states:

Jurisdiction

1. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. (( 1985, 1986, as claims arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. (( 1331, 1343(a)(1) and (a)(2). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's other claims for relief as state law claims so related to Plaintiff's claim in the action within the original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.

Summary of case

2. This case arises from a conspiracy to obstruct justice into the investigations of the death of deputy White House counsel Vincent W. Foster.

3. Wrongful acts alleged herein were violations of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2) as overt acts of two or more Defendants in furtherance of a conspiracy to deter by intimidation or threat, Plaintiff, a grand jury witness in US District Court for the District of Columbia, from attending the grand jury proceeding, or from testifying to matters pending therein freely, fully, and truthfully.

4. Overt acts alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed between the time period of April 15, 1994 through November 2, 1995. Because the overt acts directed at Plaintiff were the reasonably foreseeable, necessary and natural consequences of the conspiracy when entered into, each member of the conspiracy is liable for Plaintiff's damages by virtue of his membership in the conspiracy.

5. Overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy included harassment of Plaintiff on the eve of his testimony before a Washington, DC federal grand jury, beginning the same day Plaintiff received a grand jury subpoena. The subpoena was served by Defendant FBI Agent Russell Bransford, assigned to the Office of Independent Counsel under Kenneth W. Starr.

6. Defendant Bransford was formerly assigned to the Office of Independent Counsel under Robert W. Fiske, Jr., where Defendant Bransford worked with Defendant FBI Agent Larry Monroe. The first overt act alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by Defendant Monroe in April, 1994, when Defendant Monroe interviewed Plaintiff and falsified statements made by Plaintiff regarding events he witnessed in Fort Marcy Park on July 20, 1993 within 70 minutes of the discovery of Mr. Foster's body. The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") is a principal Defendant in this case.

7. Plaintiff was harassed by at least 26 Defendants prior to testifying before the Whitewater grand jury, and one Defendant after testifying:

(1) Eleven or more Defendants on October 26, 1995;

(2) Twelve or more Defendants on October 27, 1995;

(3) Two or more Defendants on October 28, 1995;

(4) Defendant FBI Agent Bransford on October 30, 1995; and

(5) One Defendant on November 2, 1995.

8. The objects of the harassment were twofold, to:

(1) Intimidate and warn Plaintiff; and failing that, to

(2) Destabilize and discredit Plaintiff.

This technique of subjecting a witness to an overwhelming campaign of non-verbal harassment to

(1) intimidate and warn, and

(2) to destabilize and discredit the witness is known to federal intelligence and investigative agencies. The technique is a form of what is known as "psychological operations" or "Psychops." Parties

9. Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton is an individual residing at 2424 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC.

10. Plaintiff avers that overt acts alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy were committed at the direction or with the knowledge or consent of Defendant United States by and through the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Defendant United States thereby committed, permitted, or impliedly or expressly ratified the wrongful overt acts alleged and is liable to Plaintiff under principles of agency and respondeat superior.

11. Defendant Lawrence Monroe ("AGENT MONROE") is sued herein both in his individual capacity and as agent of the FBI. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that AGENT MONROE resides at 8128 Blandsford Drive, Manassas, Virginia, and that he is currently employed by the United States XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX. At all times material hereto, AGENT MONROE was employed by the FBI acting within the scope of his employment as Special Agent assigned to the Office of Special Counsel under Robert B. Fiske, Jr.

12. Defendant Russell T. Bransford ("AGENT BRANSFORD") is sued herein both in his individual capacity and as agent of the FBI. AGENT BRANSFORD was employed by the FBI acting within the scope of his employment as Special Agent assigned to the Office of Special Counsel under Robert B. Fiske, Jr., where he worked with AGENT MONROE, and was subsequently employed by the FBI acting within the scope of his employment as Special Agent assigned to the Office of Independent Counsel under Kenneth W. Starr.

13. Defendant Ayman Alouri ("AYMAN ALOURI") is an individual whose last known residence address was 1707 Tyvale Court, Vienna, Virginia. Plaintiff avers that Defendant AYMAN ALOURI is a citizen of the country of Jordan.

14. Defendant Abdel Salem Alouri ("ABDEL ALOURI") is an individual whose last known residence address was 1707 Tyvale Court, Vienna, Virginia. Plaintiff avers that ABDEL ALOURI is a citizen of the country of Jordan.

15. Defendant John Doe No. 1 ("ONE"), through Defendant John Doe No. 24 ("TWENTY-FOUR"), inclusive, are all male individuals, sued herein under fictitious names, their names and capacities being unknown to Plaintiff who will seek leave of this Court to amend his Complaint by inserting their true names and capacities in the place and stead of the fictitious names when the same have been ascertained.

16. All wrongful acts alleged herein were commenced by agreement, concert of action, or a meeting of the minds by and between two or more named or unnamed Defendants. All Defendants are conspirators. As all conspirators are not presently known, Plaintiff will, should it become appropriate, seek leave to amend this Complaint to name other Defendants. Some of the named or unnamed Defendant conspirators joined the conspiracy at different times through agreement or concert of action, the particulars of which are not presently known to Plaintiff who will, should it become appropriate, seek leave to amend this Complaint.

FACTS

Background

17. On July 20, 1993 Plaintiff witnessed events in Fort Marcy Park within 70 minutes of the discovery of the body of Mr. Vincent Foster.

18. On April 15, 1994, AGENT MONROE, while assigned to the Office of Special Counsel under Robert B. Fiske, Jr., interviewed Plaintiff. While showing Plaintiff six or more photographs of Foster's car, AGENT MONROE questioned Plaintiff in excess of 15 times in various ways whether the Honda he saw with Arkansas license plates (in the same parking space where Foster's Honda was later found) could have been Foster's 1989 taupe colored Honda. Plaintiff repeatedly and adamantly responded no; that the Honda he saw was older, of a different body style, and was rust-brown in color. At the conclusion of the interview, AGENT MONROE asked Plaintiff "not to go to the press" with his story. Soon thereafter, in accordance with AGENT MONROE's request, Plaintiff declined an on-air interview with radio talk show host G. Gordon Liddy.

19. On May 11, 1994, AGENT MONROE interviewed Plaintiff a second time. AGENT MONROE again repeatedly questioned Plaintiff whether the Honda he saw could have been Foster's 1989 taupe colored Honda, this time while showing Plaintiff reports of statements of other witnesses. Each time Plaintiff responded no. During the interview, Plaintiff picked out two car color panels in the FBI laboratory, which were identified by the FBI laboratory technician as a 1983 and 1984 Honda (both panels were the same color).

20. Subsequent to interviewing Plaintiff, AGENT MONROE prepared reports of Plaintiff's statements. Having failed to obtain an admission from Plaintiff that the Honda Plaintiff saw could have been Foster's 1989 taupe colored Honda, AGENT MONROE, knowingly and with specific intent to obstruct justice, falsified Plaintiff's account of the 1983 or 1984 rust-brown Honda Plaintiff observed. AGENT MONROE stated that Plaintiff "identified this particular vehicle as a 1988 to 1990... Honda with Arkansas plates." Because Plaintiff observed a Honda with Arkansas plates (similar to but not Foster's) approximately 70 minutes before the discovery of his body, in the same parking space where Foster's car was later found, Plaintiff's information refutes AGENT MONROE's sworn conclusion that Mr. Foster committed suicide in Fort Marcy Park.

21. This and other false statements appearing in AGENT MONROE's reports of Plaintiff's statements in furtherance of the conspiracy are set forth below in paragraph 28(b). These false statements are overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to obstruct justice.

22. On June 30, 1994 the Report of the Independent Counsel In Re Vincent W. Foster, Jr. ("Fiske Report") was published. On July 29, 1994, AGENT MONROE testified before the Senate Banking Committee, where he supported, joined and adopted the Fiske Report as his own statement. That portion of the Fiske Report which summarizes Plaintiff's statements reflects additional overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to obstruct justice. The Fiske Report:

(a) Strongly implies that the "Japanese-made car" Plaintiff observed was in fact Foster's and omits that the Honda Plaintiff saw was an older model and different in color than Foster's;

(b) Fails to mention the briefcase Plaintiff reported see- ing in the Honda;

(c) Fails to mention the wine coolers Plaintiff reported seeing in the Honda;

(d) Misstates the placement of a suit jacket Plaintiff re- ported he observed in the Honda;

(e) Misstates the time Plaintiff reported he entered the park; and

(f) Omits that Plaintiff reported observing a man in the park acting very suspiciously.

23. AGENT BRANSFORD or one or more of the other six FBI Agents assigned to Fiske's Office of Independent Counsel interviewed and prepared reports of statements of two other witnesses in Fort Marcy Park, who, 20 to 35 minutes before the discovery of Foster's body, saw the same Honda Plaintiff saw parked in the same spot (where Foster's car was later found). AGENT MONROE and the Fiske Report posit that the subject car was in fact Foster's Honda. These two witnesses reported that "a white male was seated in the driver's seat" and "the hood of the vehicle was up and [another] white male was standing in the vicinity." In spite of the fact that these two witnesses reported seeing two men in and around what the Fiske Report posits was Foster's Honda, at a time when Mr. Foster's body was lying less than 700 feet from that Honda, AGENT MONROE and the Fiske Report declare that "Neither [of these two witnesses]... observed anything unusual."

24. The foregoing excerpt from the Fiske Report is but one of many overt acts contained in that Report in furtherance of the conspiracy to obstruct justice into the investigations into Mr. Foster's death. These overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy show motive for violations of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2) against Plaintiff. Morever, these overt acts are intimately connected and blended with the facts of the violations of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2) alleged. Other overtly false and misleading statements in the Fiske Report in furtherance of the conspiracy to obstruct justice into the investigations into Mr. Foster's death include but are not limited to the following:

1. "Lisa Foster stated that the gun looked similar to the one that she had seen in their home in Arkansas and that she had brought to Washington."

Lisa Foster's statement did not say she "had seen," it says she "may have seen." There is no record in any of her official statements that she brought a black gun to Washington. The only gun she reported bringing to Washington was a "silver six-gun." Fiske did not mention the silver gun in his report. The gun found in Foster's hand was black. (See pp. 1646, 2227, Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate. Hearings Related to Madison Guaranty S&L and the Whitewater Development Corporation, Washington, DC phase, ("S. Hrg. 103-889")).

2. "When shown the gun, Foster's sister Sharon Bowman, identified it as appearing very similar to one their father had kept in his bedside table, specifically the pattern on the grip."

Sharon Bowman was never shown the gun. She was shown a photograph of the gun. She said only that the grip was similar to the gun Foster's father owned. When asked if other parts were similar, she responded, "No." (pp. 741, 2169, S. Hrg. 103-889);

3. "CW (confidential witness) acknowledges that, because of his position at the top of the berm and the heavy foliage, there could have been a gun in the man's hands that he did not see."

CW made this statement only after he was asked numerous times if he had seen a gun. Numerous times he said, "No." CW later said he was badgered by the questions. The FBI refused to show him a photograph which he requested to verify what he saw. Later when he saw the photograph of Foster's hand with a gun in it, he positively denied that was what he saw. He has repeatedly stated that he closely looked at the hands and there was no gun. (See p. 1642, S. Hrg. 103-889);

4. "CW further stated that he believed the man's palms were facing upward."

Anyone reading the reports of this witness' statements would know there was no doubt. The report frequently injects words like "believed" and "appeared" when the statements contradict the conclusion of suicide where the body was found. (See p. 2226, S. Hrg. 103-889);

5. "experts in the FBI Laboratory performed a thorough analysis of the available evidence."

No attempt was made to determine the origin of hair and carpet fibers found on Mr. Foster's clothing. (See pp. 67-68, S. Hrg. 103-889);

6. "Everyone known to have been in Fort Marcy Park on the afternoon or evening of July 20, 1993 also was questioned..."

The following persons were never questioned: men seen in and around the 1983 or 1984 rust-brown Honda, the man in the blue-gray Japanese car, volunteers working on the trail mentioned by Officer Fornshill, men seen getting dressed in the woods by paramedics, and a jogger. (See pp. 917-918, 1161, 1387, 1470-1474, 1715-1730, S. Hrg. 103-889);

7. "Park Police who were present when Foster's body was rolled over observed a fairly large pool of blood on the ground where his head had been."

Park Police Officer Rolla, present at the scene when Foster's body was rolled over, stated that he did not remember blood on the ground. He said most of the blood was on the head. (See pp. 427, 629, 1659 Senate Hearings);

8. "Foliage leading up to and around Foster's body was dense."

This sentence was used to explain why no dirt was on Foster's shoes. Directly in front of the second cannon is a dirt path. Numerous eyewitneses described this dirt path.

9. "The overwhelming weight of the evidence compels the conclusion, however, that Vincent Foster committed suicide in Fort Marcy Park on July 20, 1993."

The overwhelming weight of evidence compels the conclusion that the Fiske Report manipulated the facts to support its conclusion and that the Report omits facts that contradict its conclusion.

25. On October 13, 1995, an investigative journalist showed Plaintiff written summaries of his statements which Plaintiff had not seen, prepared by AGENT MONROE.

26. On October 22, 1995, a newspaper article entitled "Death in the Park: Is this the killer?" appeared in the London Sunday Telegraph. The article reported that Plaintiff was in Fort Marcy Park the day Vincent Foster's body was discovered. An artist's sketch of a man Plaintiff saw in the Park appeared with the article, which was subtitled, "Foster mystery: a key witness ignored by the FBI reveals the face". It states in part:

When the Sunday Telegraph showed him police judicial summaries of his testimony - which he had not seen - he was stunned, saying his statements have been falsified...

The other [car in the parking lot of Fort Marcy Park] was a blue sedan, possibly a Japanese make. There was a man in his twenties sitting inside it with a manicured appearance. He lowered his window and gave Knowlton a threatening look... (emphasis added)

His FBI statement says that Knowlton "could not further identify this individual and stated that he would be unable to recognize him in the future". "That's an outright lie," he said, angrily...

The Sunday Telegraph asked if he would be willing to help with an artist's sketch of the suspect. He agreed... The sketch above was drawn by an experienced police artist...

Starr's investigators have never talked to Knowlton. The federal grand jury has never summoned him to give sworn testimony...

27. Four days after this article was published overseas, and two days after it was available in the United States, on Thursday, October 26, 1995, Plaintiff was served a subpoena by AGENT BRANSFORD to appear and testify before the Washington, DC, Whitewater grand jury six days later, Wednesday, November 1.

28. Plaintiff expected to be called to testify before the grand jury on the following matters:

(a) Within 80 minutes of the discovery of Vincent Foster's corpse, Plaintiff observed in Fort Marcy Park:

(1) A rust-brown Honda with Arkansas plates [similar to but not the 1989 Honda Foster reportedly drove to the park];

(2) The following items in the rust-brown Honda:

(a) a suit jacket;

(b) a briefcase; and

(c) two full bottles of wine cooler;

(3) A newer blue-gray sedan, backed in three or four spaces to the right of the rust-brown Honda; and

(4) A Middle Eastern or Hispanic looking man seated in the driver's seat of the blue-gray sedan.

Plaintiff expected to testify what the man did as he sat in the driver's side of his backed in car:

(5) As Plaintiff parked his car, the man lowered his passenger side electric window and gave Plaintiff a constant fierce stare;

As Plaintiff exited his car, the man exited the blue-gray sedan. As Plaintiff walked toward the foot path entrance to the park, the man leaned on the roof of his sedan while continuing to stare at Plaintiff;

Plaintiff entered the Park and chose to walk in the opposite direction from where Foster's body was found, whereupon the man got back in his car; and

Approximately three minutes later, when Plaintiff returned to his own car, he observed the man again seated in the driver's seat of the blue-gray sedan still staring at him.

(b) Plaintiff also expected to testify about the FBI 302 Reports of his statements, prepared in April and May of 1994 by AGENT MONROE while assigned to the Office of Special Counsel under Robert Fiske. Specifically, Plaintiff expected to testify:

(1) Referring to the man in the blue-gray sedan, the FBI report states that Plaintiff "could not further identify this particular individual nor his attire and stated that he would be unable to recognize him in the future." Plaintiff told the FBI interviewers just the opposite;

(2) The FBI Report states that Plaintiff identified the blue-gray sedan as having "Virginia license plates..." Plaintiff told the FBI that he hadn't seen the license plates on that car;

(3) Regarding the contents of the rust-brown Honda, the 302 states that Plaintiff "could furnish no other descriptive data regarding the vehicle or for that matter the contents located within the vehicle.", thus omitting that Plaintiff reported seeing two wine cooler bottles on the back seat; and

(4) Referring to the rust-brown Honda, the 302 stated Plaintiff "identified this particular vehicle as a 1988 to 1990... Honda with Arkansas plates." Plaintiff responded over 20 times that the Honda he saw was older and a different color than Foster's 1989 Honda.

Harassment

29. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that he is the only witness who is certain of the description of the Honda he saw and of the contents he observed in that Honda.

30. Having failed to obtain an admission from Plaintiff that the car he saw could have been Mr. Foster's, AGENT MONROE falsified his reports of Plaintiff's statements to conceal Plaintiff's account. When a story was published that AGENT MONROE concealed the fact that the car Plaintiff saw was not Foster's, and that AGENT MONROE and the FBI falsified Plaintiff's account, Defendants conspired and schemed to neutralize Plaintiff's statements, both made and anticipated. Defendants undertook to engage in conduct known in intelligence circles: To effect an overwhelming campaign of harassment and intimidation to neutralize any damage Plaintiff could do to the ongoing conspiracy to hide the circumstances of Mr. Foster's death, by:

(1) Intimidating and warning Plaintiff; and failing that, by

(2) Destabilizing and discrediting Plaintiff.

This modus operandi is known in the intelligence community.

31. Beginning later the same day AGENT BRANSFORD served Plaintiff the subpoena, Thursday, October 26, 1995, which subpoena was known only to the FBI and the Office of Independent Counsel, Defendants, and each of them, began a campaign of harassment, intimidation, terror, and psychological attack upon Plaintiff, committing overt acts intended to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, to wit, to deter Plaintiff from testifying freely, fully and truthfully before the grand jury by intimidating and warning him, and to destabilize and discredit Plaintiff. Overt acts undertaken by Defendants against Plaintiff in furtherance of the conspiracy included but were not limited to overt acts alleged below.

32. On October 26, 1995, Plaintiff discussed by telephone with his girlfriend their plans for that evening. Plaintiff and his girlfriend agreed to take one of Plaintiff's routine walks, from Plaintiff's residence to the Dupont Circle neighborhood. The two agreed to go to the Dupont Circle CVS and then to a specific restaurant in the Dupont Circle neighborhood.

33. During the evening of October 26, 1995, Plaintiff and his companion ("Kathy") walked on the public street. Defendant ONE walked toward them while constantly staring directly at Plaintiff's face. Kathy directed Plaintiff's attention to ONE's behavior. ONE directed a fierce glare into Plaintiff's eyes as he approached, and continued this uninterrupted glare as he walked past Plaintiff. After they passed, ONE stopped and continued to watch Plaintiff as he raised his left wrist to his mouth and spoke into his coat sleeve.

34. Within five seconds after Plaintiff's contact with ONE, Defendant TWO walked directly toward Plaintiff while directing a constant fierce glare at Plaintiff's face, then cut to Plaintiff's left, turned his head toward Plaintiff, past Kathy, all the while continuously glaring into Plaintiff's eyes.

35. Approximately twenty seconds after Plaintiff's contact with TWO, Defendant THREE approached them from ahead, and while passing on Plaintiff's right, glared fiercely into Plaintiff's eyes, and continued to do so as he passed.

36. Approximately four minutes after Plaintiff's contact with THREE, Kathy waited in line at the CVS pharmacy counter while Plaintiff sat in a nearby chair. During the five minutes Defendant FOUR stood in line behind Kathy, FOUR did not face forward, but rather stood facing Plaintiff and continuously glared fiercely at Plaintiff as FOUR moved up in line. When Kathy handed her prescription to the pharmacist, FOUR walked away.

37. Approximately four minutes after Plaintiff's contact with FOUR, Defendant FIVE stood approximately 50 feet away, continually staring in Plaintiff's direction. FIVE walked toward Plaintiff and directed a fierce glare into Plaintiff's eyes as he approached and passed.

38. As a direct and proximate result of the continuous and persistent physical displays of Defendants ONE through FIVE, inclusive, Plaintiff reasonably believed the entire course of conduct was a single continuing action, and reasonably feared the use of harmful physical force by Defendants to cause severe bodily harm to Plaintiff.

39. Approximately one minute after Plaintiff's contact with FIVE, as Plaintiff and Kathy walked northbound, Defendant SIX stood military "at-ease" style on the corner glaring at Plaintiff as they approached. As Plaintiff reached the corner, SIX pivoted on one foot, keeping his military-type "at-ease" stance while glaring fiercely at Plaintiff, then followed Plaintiff at a distance of about three feet the length of the block. SIX came from behind and overtook Plaintiff and Kathy on their right while continually glaring at Plaintiff, again assumed the military-type "at-ease" stance and continued to glare fiercely at Plaintiff.

40. As a direct and proximate result of the continuous and persistent physical displays of ONE through SIX, inclusive, Plaintiff reasonably concluded the entire course of conduct of ONE through SIX was a single continuing action, and as SIX followed three feet behind him, Plaintiff reasonably feared the imminent use of harmful physical force by SIX. Plaintiff's emotional distress was so extreme that he felt physically sick and his legs felt rubbery.

41. At this point in time, one of the objects of Defendants' conspiracy was realized: Plaintiff reasonably concluded that this bizarre continuing harassment and intimidation was related to the subpoena to testify before the grand jury in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, served earlier that day.

42. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's contact with SIX, Defendant SEVEN paced back and forth about 50 feet ahead. SEVEN constantly glared at Plaintiff before, during and after Plaintiff and Kathy passed. 43. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's contacts with SIX and SEVEN, Defendant EIGHT walked directly toward Plaintiff while constantly glaring at him. EIGHT passed Plaintiff on his right and brushed against him while constantly glaring fiercely directly into his eyes, and continued to glare at Plaintiff after he passed. 44. EIGHT'S physical contact with Plaintiff was an offensive, harmful, offensive touching. Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. He reasonably feared the imminent use of harmful physical force by Defendants to cause severe bodily harm to himself and to Kathy, and was a nervous wreck.

45. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's contacts with SIX and EIGHT, Defendant NINE stood on the northwest corner of R Street and Connecticut Avenue, staring directly toward Plaintiff.

46. The simultaneous harassment by SIX, EIGHT and NINE, immediately following the back-to-back harassment of ONE through SIX, inclusive, caused Kathy extreme emotional distress. She became panic-stricken and struggled to maintain her composure and to keep from weeping. Plaintiff feared for Kathy as well as himself.

47. As soon as Plaintiff and Kathy began to cross the street at the intersection, NINE, while continually staring at Plaintiff, crossed the street so that he reached the corner at the same time as Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Kathy walked arm-in-arm southbound, whereupon NINE walked southbound to the left and three feet abreast of Kathy while looking over Kathy and directly at Plaintiff's face. Plaintiff and Kathy increased their pace, whereupon NINE also increased his pace. After Plaintiff was ahead of NINE, Kathy and Plaintiff stopped in front of a restaurant window. NINE passed by slowly while continuously glaring at Plaintiff's face, stopped three doors down, and intermittently looked to his right at Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Kathy resumed walking southbound, whereupon NINE walked southbound while looking back at Plaintiff every few seconds. Plaintiff and Kathy slowed their pace almost to a stop. NINE did the same. Plaintiff and Kathy stopped. NINE stopped and again looked at Plaintiff and Kathy every few seconds.

48. As NINE walked abreast of Plaintiff while glaring directly at him, Plaintiff again felt his legs become rubbery as he continued to suffer extreme emotional distress from the fear of imminent use of harmful physical force by NINE.

49. As Plaintiff and Kathy walked southbound approximately ten minutes after Plaintiff's contact with NINE, a southbound car driven by Defendant TEN proceeded past them very slowly. TEN pulled the car to the curb about a half-block ahead of them, exited the car, and walked toward Plaintiff and Kathy. TEN stopped then looked at them. As Plaintiff approached, TEN walked to a point about 30 feet south and glared intensely at Plaintiff as he passed. After Plaintiff and Kathy proceeded about another 75 feet, TEN opened and reached inside the car's passenger door and pulled out a telephone or walkie-talkie and spoke into it while looking in Plaintiff's direction.

50. When TEN reached inside the passenger's side door of the car, Plaintiff reasonably believed TEN might be retrieving a gun, and Plaintiff and Kathy again reasonably entertained thoughts they might be harmed.

51. Approximately fifteen minutes after Plaintiff's contact with TEN, Plaintiff and Kathy sat in the downstairs dining area of a restaurant, whereupon Defendant ELEVEN stood in the mall area looking directly at them for approximately one minute. About three minutes later, ELEVEN walked down the stairs and through the dining area, where he slowed his pace while staring directly at Plaintiff. About fifteen seconds later, ELEVEN walked back through the dining area and again slowed his pace and stared directly at Plaintiff, then proceeded back up the stairs. Approximately five minutes later, ELEVEN reappeared in the mall area staring down at Plaintiff.

52. On Friday, October 27, 1995, the day following Plaintiff's contacts with Defendants ONE through ELEVEN, the next time Plaintiff went out in public, at around 9:30 a.m., Plaintiff and Kathy walked northbound. A northbound black Nissan Altima, bearing a Maryland license plate, with Defendant TWELVE driving and Defendant THIRTEEN in the passenger's seat, drove by very slowly. TWELVE and THIRTEEN stared directly at Plaintiff. Approximately one minute later, the car came back southbound, slowed when it reached Plaintiff, whereupon TWELVE and THIRTEEN again stared directly at Plaintiff.

53. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that the car occupied by Defendant TWELVE and Defendant THIRTEEN was a federal government vehicle.

54. The same day of Plaintiff's contacts with TWELVE and THIRTEEN, October 27, 1995, at around 1:00 p.m., the next time Plaintiff ventured out in public, Plaintiff and Christopher Ruddy ("Ruddy") walked eastbound. Approximately two minutes after they left Plaintiff's building, Defendant FOURTEEN crossed the street so that they all reached the corner at the same time. FOURTEEN glared at Plaintiff, raised his eyebrows and from the waist pointed his finger at Plaintiff as if to say "gotcha." FOURTEEN then walked on. Ruddy approached FOURTEEN, produced his journalist ID, and spoke to FOURTEEN, whereupon FOURTEEN introduced himself as "Joe Colter," said he had worked at the White House, a World Bank organization, as an advisor to Bill Clinton, and currently at an international technology business.

55. FOURTEEN reintroduced himself and shook Plaintiff's hand while saying, "I didn't hear your name." Plaintiff repeated "Patrick Knowlton," whereupon FOURTEEN gave Plaintiff's hand a hard squeeze and while leaning forward and glaring into his eyes, said, "Nice to meet you, Mr. Knowlton."

56. Plaintiff reasonably understood FOURTEEN'S pointing his finger as if to say "gotcha" as a direct threat of harm. When FOURTEEN spoke to Plaintiff, Plaintiff reasonably believed that FOURTEEN'S purpose for stopping was to show Plaintiff FOURTEEN knew exactly who he was. Plaintiff experienced severe emotional distress and appeared physically ill.

57. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's conversation with FOURTEEN, Defendant FIFTEEN watched from his position standing on the sidewalk about sixty feet away. FIFTEEN approached and stared at Plaintiff's face for about thirty seconds. FIFTEEN then left.

58. When FIFTEEN approached, Plaintiff became extremely distressed that FOURTEEN and FIFTEEN intended to assault Plaintiff.

59. Approximately thirty seconds after Plaintiff's contacts with FOURTEEN and FIFTEEN, as Ruddy and Plaintiff continued walking around Washington Circle, a white Honda bearing Virginia license plates stopped in a no-parking zone in the northbound lane of 23rd Street, at Washington Circle. The car was driven by Defendant AYMAN ALOURI. Defendant ABDEL ALOURI occupied the passenger's seat. AYMAN ALOURI and ABDEL ALOURI continuously stared in Plaintiff's direction as Plaintiff crossed in front of the car and proceeded around the circle. AYMAN ALOURI drove the car very slowly onto the circle and past Plaintiff while ABDEL ALOURI continuously glared at Plaintiff. The car went around the circle, out of sight. Seconds later the car approached them from behind and drove slowly past as both AYMAN ALOURI and ABDEL ALOURI glared at Plaintiff. The car stopped about sixty feet ahead, whereupon AYMAN ALOURI and ABDEL ALOURI adjusted the car mirrors so as to watch Plaintiff. Ruddy and Plaintiff walked in the direction of the car and observed the license plate just before AYMAN ALOURI drove the car through a red light and sped away.

60. When AYMAN ALOURI and ABDEL ALOURI circled back and came alongside them, Plaintiff was again fearful of being in danger of imminent harmful physical force.

61. Approximately thirty seconds after Plaintiff's contact with AYMAN ALOURI and ABDEL ALOURI, as Plaintiff and Ruddy continued eastbound, Defendant SIXTEEN approached while staring directly at Plaintiff's face as he passed. SIXTEEN then walked ahead of Plaintiff and Ruddy. As Plaintiff and Ruddy walked slowly for the next half block, SIXTEEN looked back at Plaintiff every few seconds.

62. As a direct and proximate result of the continuous and persistent physical displays of the aforementioned eighteen Defendants, Plaintiff reasonably concluded the entire course of conduct of the Defendants was a single continuing action, reasonably feared the imminent use of harmful physical force, and suffered extreme emotional distress. He felt overwhelmed, and again felt physically sick.

63. Simultaneously with Plaintiff's contact with SIXTEEN, as Plaintiff approached the middle of the block, Defendant SEVENTEEN passed them on Ruddy's left while staring at Plaintiff. When SEVENTEEN got about five paces in front of them, Ruddy approached him and tried to speak to him, whereupon SEVENTEEN walked into a children's health clinic.

64. As Plaintiff and Ruddy continued to walk eastbound, SIXTEEN stood on the sidewalk about 60 feet ahead looking in their direction. SIXTEEN then resumed walking eastbound ahead of them, then turned right on 21st Street. Plaintiff and Ruddy followed as SIXTEEN walked eastbound in front of the 2000 Penn Mall.

65. As Ruddy and Plaintiff entered that block, Defendant EIGHTEEN walked directly toward Plaintiff while giving Plaintiff a constant purposeful glare. EIGHTEEN passed Plaintiff on his right, continuously glaring at him.

66. Five minutes later, as Plaintiff and Ruddy exited the 2000 Penn Mall, SIXTEEN and EIGHTEEN stood conversing 50 feet to their right. EIGHTEEN looked toward Plaintiff and Ruddy, and began walking toward them. SIXTEEN then raised his left wrist to his mouth and spoke into his coat sleeve and crossed 20th Street. Ruddy and Plaintiff then followed SIXTEEN down a set of stairs into a delicatessen, where Ruddy approached SIXTEEN and asked him if he was with a federal law enforcement agency. SIXTEEN replied, "Something like that," and walked away.

67. As Plaintiff neared the steps out of the delicatessen, Defendant SIX stood at the top of the stairs staring down at Plaintiff. As Plaintiff climbed the steps, Defendant SIX descended the steps past Plaintiff while constantly staring fiercely at him.

68. When Plaintiff recognized SIX from the day before, he suffered severe emotional distress from the firm belief that the entire course of conduct of all Defendants was a single continuing action. As SIX descended the steps past him, Plaintiff reasonably feared the imminent use of harmful physical force, suffered further emotional distress, and again felt physically sick.

69. Approximately three minutes later, Plaintiff exited the building and sat down alone at a sidewalk table, whereupon Defendant NINETEEN bumped Plaintiff's chair from behind, and walked past him while glaring. As Ruddy exited the building, Plaintiff approached him and pointed out NINETEEN, who was looking in a bank window and intermittently peering at Plaintiff.

70. NINETEEN'S physical contact with Plaintiff was an offensive, harmful, offensive touching.

71. Defendant TWENTY then walked past Plaintiff while glaring at him.

72. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' intensified campaign of continuous and persistent harassment and intimidation by wrongful overt acts of the aforementioned 22 Defendants, Plaintiff suffered extreme emotional distress and feelings of being overwhelmed, to the point where Plaintiff could feel his body shaking.

73. As Plaintiff sat in the passenger's seat with Ruddy sitting in the driver's seat of a Jeep, Defendant TWENTY-ONE approached the rear of the Jeep and paused staring at the license plate. TWENTY-ONE walked next to where Plaintiff was seated while staring at Plaintiff, then around to the front of the Jeep, where he stared at the front plate. Plaintiff snapped a photograph of TWENTY-ONE, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and by this reference incorporated herein.

74. Later that afternoon, AGENT BRANSFORD's superiors received actual notice that Plaintiff was the target of an orchestrated campaign of harassment and intimidation. The FBI failed and refused to respond until the following week.

75. On Saturday, October 28, 1995, at approximately 12:15 a.m., Defendant TWENTY-TWO rang the doorbell to Plaintiff's apartment as Plaintiff slept. Plaintiff called out "Who's there?" TWENTY-TWO knocked on Plaintiff's door, then departed. Plaintiff believes and therefore alleges that it was TWENTY-TWO who several times earlier that evening harassed Plaintiff by calling his apartment from the lobby telephone, and hung up when the telephone was answered.

76. The next time he left his Apartment building, at approximately 9:15 a.m. on Saturday, October 28, Plaintiff walked west on Pennsylvania Avenue. As Plaintiff approached the corner of 25th Street, Defendant TWENTY-THREE approached on foot from behind. Plaintiff stopped, whereupon TWENTY-THREE slowed his pace. Plaintiff increased his pace, whereupon TWENTY-THREE increased his pace. Plaintiff slowed his step, whereupon TWENTY-THREE did the same. Plaintiff stopped. TWENTY-THREE stopped. Plaintiff again walked, whereupon TWENTY-THREE followed. Plaintiff stopped. TWENTY-THREE hesitated then walked slowly past Plaintiff. After TWENTY-THREE passed, Plaintiff continued to walk about ten feet behind TWENTY-THREE. TWENTY-THREE then slowed his pace almost to a stop. Plaintiff walked quickly past TWENTY-THREE for about another half block. TWENTY-THREE followed briskly. Plaintiff stopped at a sidewalk book display. TWENTY-THREE then stopped and looked in the window of a closed tailor shop. While pretending to look at the books, Plaintiff took out his camera then resumed walking westbound for five or so paces. TWENTY-THREE followed, whereupon Plaintiff quickly turned around and snapped a photograph of TWENTY-THREE, with the flash, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2 and by this reference incorporated herein. TWENTY-THREE said nothing and walked past Plaintiff.

77. The FBI has had the identity of Defendant TWENTY-THREE since at least as of November 6, 1995.

78. On Monday, October 31, 1995 at around noon, four days after the harassment began, and three days after the FBI received actual notice of it, AGENT BRANSFORD telephoned Plaintiff and agreed to visit Plaintiff later that day. AGENT BRANSFORD reluctantly agreed to call Plaintiff in advance of his visit so Plaintiff's lawyer could be present.

79. That afternoon AGENT BRANSFORD called from his car phone while parked in front of Plaintiff's building. AGENT BRANSFORD reluctantly agreed to wait to visit until Plaintiff contacted his lawyer and his lawyer arrived. Plaintiff hung up the phone then picked it up to telephone his lawyer. Plaintiff's telephone line was dead.

80. AGENT BRANSFORD arrived at Plaintiff's door two or three minutes later, whereupon AGENT BRANSFORD immediately remarked that "If there was a phone tap on there, you'd never know it, they're totally undetectable." After displaying his weapon, AGENT BRANSFORD refused to provide Plaintiff protection, explained that he worked under Fiske, that he was kept on under Starr, and that he worked with AGENT MONROE. During their conversation, AGENT BRANSFORD grinned at Plaintiff as if he knew exactly what had happened to Plaintiff. In response to Plaintiff's question whether Plaintiff should trust him, AGENT BRANSFORD responded, "I don't know Mr. Knowlton, that's a good question." Plaintiff ordered AGENT BRANSFORD out of his home, whereupon Plaintiff's telephone rang and his telephone service was immediately restored.

81. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that AGENT BRANSFORD purposely disabled Plaintiff's telephone to prevent Plaintiff from contacting his lawyer, that AGENT BRANSFORD was carrying a wireless transmitter and that another FBI Agent was monitoring their conversation, and that this other FBI Agent called Plaintiff's telephone number to signal AGENT BRANSFORD to exit Plaintiff's apartment when Plaintiff became upset and ordered AGENT BRANSFORD out of Plaintiff's apartment.

82. The object of the aforementioned overt acts of AGENT BRANSFORD was to obstruct the investigation into the grand jury probe by further harassing and intimidating Plaintiff in an effort to intimidate, warn, destabilize and discredit him on the eve of his grand jury appearance.

83. On Wednesday, November 1, 1995 Plaintiff testified before a District of Columbia federal grand jury investigating the death of deputy White House counsel Vincent W. Foster. Prosecutors questioning Plaintiff during his grand jury appearance were apprised prior to Plaintiff's appearance of his reports of being harassed by in excess of 25 men. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff avers that Defendants' accomplished their object of discrediting Plaintiff. Prosecutors did not believe Plaintiff's bizarre account of being harassed, at one point asking Plaintiff to "tell us a little bit about the alleged harassment."

84. On Thursday, November 2, 1995 at about 3:30 p.m., as Plaintiff exited the elevator of his apartment building, Defendant TWENTY-FOUR stood outside with his back to the building. TWENTY-FOUR entered Plaintiff's building, made eye contact with Plaintiff, acted startled and immediately turned around and walked out the door. TWENTY-FOUR loitered in front of the building entrance. Plaintiff walked out the door and walked to his right, whereupon TWENTY-FOUR followed. Plaintiff continued to the corner and retrieved a paper from the newspaper box, looked up and saw TWENTY-FOUR looking down and reaching into his bag with his right hand. TWENTY-FOUR looked up and made eye contact with Plaintiff and immediately yanked his hand out of the bag and dropped the bag to his side. After Plaintiff and TWENTY-FOUR walked past one another, Plaintiff reversed course and walked toward TWENTY-FOUR, whereupon TWENTY-FOUR turned and ran. 85. As Plaintiff observed TWENTY-FOUR reach into his bag, Plaintiff reasonably believed TWENTY-FOUR intended to retrieve a handgun to shoot Plaintiff.

Count I

(Conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2), Obstructing justice) All Defendants.

86. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 85 as if fully repeated here.

87. All Defendants acted to violate statutory rights vested in Plaintiff, or acted with intent to cause Plaintiff harm or damage.

88. Defendants, and each of them, commenced by express or implied agreement, concert of action, communications, and meeting of the minds, a conspiracy to harass, intimidate, and psychologically attack Plaintiff by means of overt acts intended to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, to wit, to obstruct justice by deterring Plaintiff from testifying freely, fully and truthfully before the grand jury by intimidating and warning him, and to destabilize Plaintiff and to discredit Plaintiff.

89. The continuous and persistent course of Defendants' intentional wrongful conduct establishes that the entire course of conduct was a single continuing action, and that there was a meeting of the minds between two or more Defendants. 90. Each Defendant designated herein is responsible in some way for overt acts of his fellow conspirators. Accordingly, each allegation against an individual named Defendant should be read to include and be made against all Defendants, and all Defendants are therefore jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's compensatory damages.

91. Acts alleged herein were violations of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985(2) as overt acts of two or more Defendants in furtherance of a conspiracy to deter by intimidation or threat, Plaintiff, a grand jury witness in US District Court for the District of Columbia, from attending the grand jury proceeding, or from testifying to matters pending therein freely, fully, and truthfully.

92. Wrongful acts of Defendant TWENTY-FOUR constitutes a violation of 42 U.S.C. ( 1985, prohibiting conspiracy to retaliate against and to injure Plaintiff on account of his having attended and testified as a witness in a Court of the United States.

93. Conduct alleged supports Plaintiff's belief that the overall object of the conspiracy was to obstruct the investigations into the death of Vincent W. Foster, or to prevent or obstruct investigation into an FBI cover-up, or both.

94. Defendants' outrageous wrongful conduct was willful, wanton, oppressive, and in reckless disregard of the civil rights of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff to an award of punitive damages.

95. Plaintiff urges all who publicize the facts of this case to exercise due decorum and not to publicize the names of other civilian witnesses in Fort Marcy Park without obtaining their prior permission. Plaintiff wishes to express his regret to the Foster family for distress associated his with bringing this suit.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton demands that judgment be entered in his favor:

(1) Against all Defendants, jointly and severally, comensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000);

(2) Against Defendant United States, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000);

(3) Against all other Defendants, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000); and

(4) Against all Defendants, jointly and severally, an amount equal to reasonable Attorneys' fees and costs associated with the prosecution of this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ( 1988.

Count II

(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) All Defendants.

96. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 95 as if fully repeated here.

97. As a further object of the conspiracy, Plaintiff avers that Defendants, and each of them, intended to subject Plaintiff to severe emotional distress and harm.

98. By virtue of and as a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' intentional wrongful conduct, Plaintiff suffered, continues to suffer, and probably will suffer in the future, severe emotional distress. Defendants' wrongful conduct has had a significant effects on Plaintiff's overall well-being, which effects include but are not limited to: (a) depression and anxiety; (b) stomach and intestinal disorders and sleep and appetite disturbances; (c) loss of interest in sexual and exercise and other routines; (d) an exaggerated startle response; (e) impaired concentration, withdrawal, irritability, preoccupied and tense moods; (f) intense fear of personal harm and feelings of being overwhelmed and vulnerable, loss of confidence and feelings of degradation and shame; and (g) lost wages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton demands that judgment be entered in his favor:

(1) Against all Defendants, jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000);

(2) Against Defendant United States, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000); and

(4) Against all other Defendants, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000).

Count III

(Assault)

Defendants FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE, TEN, FOURTEEN, FIFTEEN, SIXTEEN, SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN, TWENTY, TWENTY-FOUR

99. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 98 as if fully repeated here.

100. As a direct and proximate cause of the threatened use of imminent harmful physical force and other physical displays by Defendants FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE, TEN, FOURTEEN, FIFTEEN, SIXTEEN, SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN, TWENTY, TWENTY-FOUR, Plaintiff reasonably feared immediate and severe bodily harm.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton demands that judgment be entered in his favor, Against Defendants FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE, TEN, FOURTEEN, FIFTEEN, SIXTEEN, SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN, TWENTY, and TWENTY-FOUR:

(1) Jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000); and

(2) Separately, punitive damages in the amount of TEN THOUAND DOLLARS ($10,000).

Count IV

(Battery)

Defendants EIGHT and NINETEEN

101. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 100 as if fully repeated here.

102. Conduct of Defendants EIGHT and NINETEEN was an offensive, harmful, offensive touching, and was a battery.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton demands that judgment be entered in his favor, against Defendants EIGHT and NINETEEN:

(1) Jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000); and

(2) Separately, punitive damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000).

Count V

(Civil Conspiracy) All Defendants .

103. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 102 as if fully repeated here.

104. The facts alleged constitute a civil conspiracy. Wrongful acts alleged herein were overt acts of two or more Defendants in furtherance of a civil conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Patrick James Knowlton demands that judgment be entered in his favor:

(1) Against all Defendants, jointly and severally, comensatory damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000);

(2) Against Defendant United States, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE MILLION DOLLARS ($1,000,000); and

(3) Against all other Defendants, separately, punitive damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($100,000).

Plaintiff demands trial by jury.


                        Respectfully submitted,



                                            
                        John H. Clarke
                        Bar # 388599
                        Attorney for Plaintiff
                        1730 K Street, NW
                        Suite 304
                        Washington, DC  20006
                        (202) 332-3030
			FAX (202) 822-8820


"Don't believe a word you hear. It was not suicide. It couldn't have been." -Assistant Attorney General Webster Hubbell, 7/20/93, cited in Esquire, 11/93.



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